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Many communities are concerned about the reuse of potentially contaminated land ("brownfields")
and believe that environmental liability is a hindrance to redevelopment. However, with land price
adjustments, liability might not impede the reuse of this land. Existing literature has found price reductions
in response to liability, but few studies have looked for an effect on vacancies. This paper studies variations
in state liability rules — specifically, strict liability and joint and several liability — that affect the
level and distribution of expected private cleanup costs.   It explores the effects of this variation on
industrial land prices and vacancy rates and on reported brownfields in a panel of cities across the
United States. In the estimated equations, joint and several liability reduces land prices and increases
vacancy rates in central cities. Neither a price nor quantity effect is estimated from strict liability. The
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sigman@econ.rutgers.eduMany communities seek to encourage the redevelopment of sites that are idle or under-used
because of potential contamination (known as “brownﬁelds”). Redevelopment of these sites is
desirable because they are a disamenity and seen as a substitute for use of relatively pristine land
(sometimes known as “greenﬁelds”), which reduces open space and requires construction of new
infrastructure. A survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) found about 25,000 brown-
ﬁeld sites in the 205 cities that responded (USCM, 2002).
Environmental liability — in particular, the threat of being compelled to pay for cleanup of
contamination — is perceived as a signiﬁcant barrier to redevelopment. The respondents to the
USCM survey cited liability as second only to lack of cleanup funding as the major obstacle to
redevelopment. In 2001, Congress passed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownﬁelds
Revitalization Act, which funded and codiﬁed an existing EPA grant and loan program for cleanup
of brownﬁelds and included several provisions to reduce the presumed liability deterrent. Reuse of
contaminated land remains an active issue for state and federal policy in the U.S. and abroad.
Despite the perception of a problem, the economics literature raises theoretical questions about
the impact of liability on redevelopment (Boyd et al., 1996; Segerson, 1993, 1994). Much of the
policy discussion fails to consider real estate price adjustments in face of expected liability and
thus may overstate the deterrent to redevelopment. Empirical questions about the role of liability
also remain. Urban and industrial decline long predates modern environmental laws, so liability
is at most a partial explanation for under-used industrial land. Previous literature has explored the
effect of liability on prices (e.g., Jackson, 2002; Alberini et al., 2006). However, only a few studies
focus on “mothballing” of land (Schoenbaum, 2002; Howland, 2000, 2004) or the deterrent to
redevelopment (McGrath, 2000). This earlier research uses the level of contamination at a site to
measure the extent of liability. This approach potentially confounds the variation in liability with
other spatial heterogeneity.1
In this paper, I use panel data on cities across the US to estimate the effects of variation in
environmental liability on prices and vacancy rates of industrial land. Most industrial land is
1For example, Schoenbaum (2002) ﬁnds a positive association between land values and brownﬁeld status in Balti-
more.
1potentially contaminated (Noonan and Vidich, 1992) and thus may be affected by liability, even
if it is not formally designated as a brownﬁeld.2 The variation in liability comes from differences
in state liability regimes, including whether they rely on strict liability and on joint and several
liability. As explained below, these regimes affect the level and the distribution of expected private
cleanup costs. States adopted and rescinded both forms of liability in the period in question. The
changing rules allow me to identify the effects of liability rules with ﬁxed effects for other spatial
heterogeneity.
I ﬁnd a negative effect of joint and several liability on industrial real estate prices in central
cities (with estimates of the reduction in prices from 16 to 26 percent) and a positive effect of
joint and several liability on industrial vacancy rates, which is also conﬁned to central cities. One
cannot reject no effect of strict liability on either prices or vacancy rates. Tests do not ﬁnd evidence
of policy endogeneity for either the price or vacancy equations, lending support to the estimated
coefﬁcients. No substitution of greenﬁelds is observed in states with high liability.
In addition to the industrial real estate market data, this paper analyzes the one national data
set on reported brownﬁelds acreage, the USCM survey mentioned above. Reported brownﬁeld
acreage is higher with joint and several liability, but not with strict liability. This analysis provides
conﬁrmation of the main effect on a different set of cities, over a different span of time, and with a
different deﬁnition of affected land.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses reasons that liability may
deter redevelopment, even with price adjustment. It also advances hypotheses about the effects of
alternative liability rules. Section 2 describes the data on state liability rules and industrial real
estate markets. Section 3 presents estimated coefﬁcients for industrial land prices and vacancy
rates and tests for problems with the results because of serial correlation or endogeneity of liability
rules. Section 4 describes the data set assembled for the USCM’s brownﬁelds survey and results
from equations estimated on these data. A ﬁnal section brieﬂy concludes with policy implications.
2Noonan and Vidich (1992) report that land used for “heavy industrial manufacturing” has a probability of con-
tamination of 88% and “light industrial manufacturing” and “industrial parks” have 75% probabilities. Conversely,
nonindustrial land, especially public facilities and commercial land, may account for 30% of reported brownﬁelds
(Wernstedt et al., 2004).
21 Liability as a deterrent to redevelopment
Under the federal Superfund and most state programs, liability for cleanup of contaminated sites
may be imposed on a number of parties, including past and present owners of the site, as well as
parties who contributed or transported contaminants to the site.3 The purchaser of land bears the
risk of liability should the site turn out to be contaminated. In addition, the original owner may
not ﬁnd its liability eliminated by the sale, given the inclusion of past landowners among the liable
parties.
The previous literature suggests three reasons that liability might not just lower land prices,
“capitalizing” liability, but also deter property sales or redevelopment. First, sellers of land and
potential buyers may have asymmetric information about the level of contamination and the nature
of the required cleanup. As Boyd et al. (1996) and Segerson (1994) argue, the resulting adverse
selection may be a source of underuse of old industrial land. Although insurance for buyers’
cleanup costs has become increasingly available, this market too is likely to be imperfect. Second,
Boyd et al. describe “imperfect detection,” in which the government (and potentially even the
owner) does not know about contamination until redevelopment, and “imperfect enforcement,” in
which the government does not enforce cleanup liability for idle sites. With imperfect detection or
enforcement, sale of the property or requests for development permits may cause the owner to bear
cleanup costs it could otherwise escape. If the cost of cleanup exceeds the value of the site clean,
the property may go undeveloped. Third, in her models, Segerson (1993, 1994) shows that shifting
liability to buyers can result in inefﬁciently low sales when sellers may be judgment proof.
In the empirical analysis, variation in the extent of liability derives from the two rules used
to impose liability: whether liability is strict and whether it is joint and several. Both these rules
likely raise expected private clean-up costs.
Strict liability means that any action that causes contamination may give rise to liability; by
3Since 1986, the federal Superfund program has allowed an “innocent landowner” defense, which exempts pur-
chasers who did not know the parcel was contaminated, made “all appropriate inquiry,” and exercised due care once
contamination was discovered. However, courts have applied various criteria for allowing this defense and in practice
have rarely found it applicable. The Brownﬁelds Act clariﬁes these concepts (in particular, regulations issued in 2005
deﬁne “all appropriate inquiry”) and may increase the frequency and reliability of this defense.
3contrast, negligence (or “at fault”) rules trigger liability only if the defendant failed to meet the
legal standard of care (however the state deﬁnes this concept) in avoiding or cleaning up contam-
ination. Strict liability thus should increase expected private cleanup costs by expanding the set
of sites at which private parties may be held liable. Strict liability also lowers the information
requirements for the government and thus its costs of bringing suit, reinforcing the incentives from
higher expected awards.4
Joint and several liability may raise expected liability for developers. When some parties are
judgment proof, joint and several liability obliges solvent parties to pick up “orphan shares,” costs
attributable to parties that have gone or might go bankrupt. These costs would be paid by the
government under non-joint, “several only,” liability, so private costs are higher with joint and
several liability. Probst et al. (1995) estimate a 14% average orphan share at federal Superfund
sites (excluding entirely orphan sites), so the cost differential may be substantial. Even if PRPs are
not judgment proof, Chang and Sigman (2007) ﬁnd that a sale raises private costs under joint and
several liability (through a variety of effects of increasing the number of defendants) and thus that
this speciﬁc form of liability is a particular problem.
2 Data
2.1 State liability rules
All U.S. states have “superfund” programs that impose liability for cleanup of contaminated sites
not covered by the federal Superfund or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
States vary in the nature of the liability rules they apply.5
The longest history of these policies is available from a series of approximately biennial stud-
4Previous papers ﬁnd evidence of higher precaution with strict liability — reduced spills (Alberini and Austin,
1999b, 2002) and fewer violations of hazardous waste laws (Stafford, 2003). These results are consistent with expected
liability costs that are higher with strict liability, although strict liability may also increase liability even if it does not
increase precaution.
5Landowners and other parties face two liability regimes, the regime in their state and the federal law. However,
state liability, which addresses sites that do not qualify for cleanup under the federal Superfund program, may be the
relevant liability threat for run-of-the-mill industrial sites.
4Table 1: Liability rules in states with industrial real estate market data, 1989–2000
State Joint & several Strict State Joint & several Strict
Alabama Never Never Mississippi Began Began
Arizona Ended Ended Missouri Never Always
Arkansas Began Began Nebraska Never Ended
California Never Always Nevada Never Began
Colorado Never Never New Hampshire Always Always
Connecticut Always Always New Jersey Always Always
Delaware Began Began New Mexico Began Began
DC Ended Ended New York Began Began
Florida Always Always North Carolina Began Began
Georgia Began Began Ohio Temporary Temporary
Hawaii Began Always Oklahoma Began Began
Idaho Never Never Oregon Always Always
Illinois Temporary Temporary Pennsylvania Always Always
Indiana Always Always Rhode Island Always Always
Iowa Always Always South Carolina Always Always
Kansas Temporary Began Tennessee Ended Ended
Kentucky Began Began Texas Always Always
Louisiana Always Always Utah Never Always
Maine Always Always Vermont Always Always
Maryland Temporary Always Virginia Never Began
Massachusetts Always Always Washington Always Always
Michigan Always Ended Wisconsin Began Ended
Source: Based on ELI surveys.
ies from 1989 through 2000 by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) (see Pendergrass, 2001).
ELI surveys the state for its policy and says it captures not just the state’s statute, but its current
interpretation by the government. Table 1 reports the status of the two liability rules in the states
with real estate market data from 1989 to 2000. The majority of transitions are permanent, at least
as far as the data extend. The policies change as a result of legislative, judicial, and administrative
decisions, including “tort reform” initiatives (Campbell, Kessler, and Shepherd, 1998).
The two liability rules are correlated, but do deviate spatially and over time. Although 96% of
observations with joint and several liability have strict liability (see Table 2), 60% of observations
without joint and several liability have strict liability; thus, it is possible to distinguish the effect of
this rule, but principally in the several-only regime. More importantly for the ﬁxed effects analysis,
5transitions between the rules do not always occur in tandem. From 1989 to 2000, ELI reports that
thirteen states adopted joint and several liability; of these thirteen, only ﬁve adopted strict liability
at the same time (some already had it). Two states and the District of Columbia report eliminating
joint and several liability; of these, only the District of Columbia also eliminated strict liability.
Similar unmatched transitions occur in the strict liability group.
2.2 Land data
The Society of Industrial and Ofﬁce Realtors’ (SIOR) annual Comparative Statistics of Industrial
and Ofﬁce Real Estate Markets has data for many U.S. cities on prices of industrial real estate and
vacancies. These data are available annually beginning in the early 1980s. All of the 75 largest
cities (by employment) and some smaller cities are in the SIOR data. Figure 1 shows the central
cities with data for any period, classiﬁed by their average vacancy rate. The data are the expert
opinions of local realtors rather than transaction data. Reliance on experts may add noise because
of the inﬂuence of respondents’ heterogeneity, but may also reduce the noise in price data that a
few large sales might have generated in some of the smaller urban areas.
The SIOR reports separate information for central city and suburban locations. Suburban land
islesslikelytobecontaminatedthancentralcitylandandthusprovidesacomparison.6 Inaddition,
a frequent argument for brownﬁeld redevelopment is that ﬁrms would otherwise use suburban sites.
The suburban data permit a direct test of this hypothesis, if ﬁrms substitute suburban sites within
the same state as the urban sites they reject. If they substitute sites in more distant suburban areas,
however, this approach will not register the substitution.
Table 2 reports mean prices and vacancy rates for industrial land for the central city and subur-
ban data sets. Prices are lower with joint and several liability in both the central cities and suburbs.
However, vacancy rates are only higher with joint and several liability in central cities; suburban
vacancy rates are essentially the same across the two sets of cities.
6A number of suburban observations have been discarded, however, because the areas in question span more than
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Figure 1: Central cities in the SIOR data set, by average vacancy rate
Table 2: Summary statistics for industrial real estate markets, by joint and several liability
All obs Without J&S With J&S
Mean St dev Mean St dev Mean St dev
Central city site price (2000$/sq ft) 3.38 5.63 4.13 5.51 2.85 5.67
Suburban site price (2000$/sq ft) 2.48 3.45 3.91 5.56 1.87 1.61
Central city vacancy rate 9.97 8.10 9.34 6.37 10.40 8.97
Suburban vacancy rate 8.10 5.27 8.15 5.93 8.07 4.93
Joint and several liability .82 – 0 – 1 –
Strict liability .63 – .60 – .96 –
73 Econometric analysis: Industrial real estate markets
Table 3 contains estimates of the coefﬁcients aL from equations of the form
Log(pit) = Li(t 1)aL+bt +gi+ f(Eit;Git;Vit)+uit; (1)
where pit is the price or the vacancy rate and Li(t 1) is a vector of state liability rules.7 The equa-
tions also include time ﬁxed effects bt, and either city ﬁxed effects, gi, or region ﬁxed effects. Some
equations include additional explanatory variables: Eit are economic conditions (city population,
unemployment rate, and manufacturing share of employment), Git are government variables (high-
way density and real estate taxes), and Vit are measures of state environmental policy (the number
of contaminated site lawyers, the League of Conservation Voters score for the state’s House delega-
tion, and the abatement cost index from Levinson (2000)). The explanatory variables are described
in the appendix. Equations without city ﬁxed effects also include variables for the legacy of con-
tamination (historical manufacturing employment and reported contaminated site density). All the
equations have a log-log functional form.
3.1 Prices
In Table 3, neither strict nor joint and several liability has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on prices
when the equations are run without city effects in column (1). When city ﬁxed effects are included
in column (2), the point estimates remain similar, but the coefﬁcient on joint and several liability
is now statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. Prices are 16% lower (based on the coefﬁcient of -.169) with
joint and several liability than without, suggesting substantial capitalization of expected private
cleanup costs. This price reduction is similar to the value of cleanup liability relief (16% of site
value) in the stated-preference study by Wernstedt et al. (2004). When time varying covariates are
added in column (3), the absolute value of the coefﬁcient falls and it is no longer statistically sig-
7The equations use a one-year lagged value of ELI-reported liability rules to try to capture the planning window
for transactions. It is unclear what point in the year the ELI survey reﬂects.
8Table 3: Estimates of the effects of liability rules
Center city Suburbs
Log Log
Log(Price) Log(Vacancy Rate) (Price) (Vac
Rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Joint and several liability -.124 -.169 -.092 .400 .362 .326 .032 .045
(.119) (.082) (.065) (.131) (.136) (.132) (.057) (.100)
Strict liability .041 .024 -.042 -.317 -.232 -.206 -.058 .094
(.123) (.094) (.087) (.118) (.131) (.132) (.056) (.119)
Geographic ﬁxed effect Region City City Region City City City City
Other explanatory var? Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .52 – – .17 – – – –
R-squared (within) – .06 .11 – .11 .12 .19 .27
Number of cities 91 97 92 100 107 101 106 104
Number of observations 522 592 525 661 749 667 753 722
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering at the city level.
All equations also include year dummies.
9niﬁcant, although the point estimate remains negative.8 Thus, these equations offer some support
for capitalization of joint and several liability.
The coefﬁcient on strict liability is counter-intuitively positive and is not statistically signiﬁcant
in any price equation in Table 3. The failure to ﬁnd effects of strict liability on prices (and below,
on vacancy rates), may indicate that this form of liability is in fact no more stringent than the
alternative negligence rules. If the standard of care required to avoid negligence is high relative
to the distribution of care actually taken, negligence rules protect few parties from liability.9 The
equations were also run with an interaction term between the strict liability and joint and several,
but the coefﬁcient on this interaction was not individually statistically signiﬁcant in any equation
for price or vacancy rate.
Timing may be a concern for these and other equations: a prospective property developer will
care about current and expected future liability. Current liability rules will be a component of
expectations both for their direct effect (cleanup is likely to be required immediately before devel-
opment can begin) and for their indications about the future. However, unobserved expectations
about the future may also play a role. If rules change over time, developers respond to expected fu-
ture rules that differ less across states than current rules; failure to measure expected future policy
results might would result in coefﬁcients closer to zero than the coefﬁcients would be on permanent
rules.10
8The number of observations drops from column (2) to (3), but the effect on the joint and several liability results
from the inclusion of the population variable, rather than the change in the data set.
9These results could be consistent with earlier studies that ﬁnd effects of strict liability on current precautions
(Alberini and Austin, 1999b, 2002; Stafford, 2003). The analysis here compares the distribution of past precaution
with the current standard of care. Current precaution levels may be enough higher that the standard of care is now
relevant.
10One quick check for timing effects is removing cities in states that temporarily changed rules in the study period;
these are cities in Maryland, Kansas, Illinois, and Ohio. Although only a small number of observations are dropped,
they are potentially inﬂuential with the “within” estimator. Dropping these observations does not markedly change the
point estimates on either liability rule.
103.2 Vacancy rates
Columns (4) through (6) in Table 3 report the coefﬁcients aL when the dependent variable is
the vacancy rate in central cities. Both liability variables have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
without city ﬁxed effects in column (4). Joint and several liability has a positive sign, suggesting
that industrial land is more likely to be vacant when private liability is greater. Strict liability
has a counterintuitive negative coefﬁcient in column (4). In the equations with ﬁxed effects, the
effect of joint and several liability continues to be statistically signiﬁcant at 5%, with only a small
reduction in its magnitude as additional controls are added. The counter-intuitive coefﬁcient on
strict liability, however, is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when city ﬁxed effects are included, so
may be an artifact of unobserved geographic heterogeneity.
These results support the view that land price adjustments are insufﬁcient to offset the costs
imposed by environmental liability. The coefﬁcient of .326 on joint and several liability in column
(6) corresponds to a 39% increase in vacancy rates in the presence of joint and several liability or
a reduction in occupied land of 4%. Since the difference is only between a less extensive form
of liability and a more extensive form of liability, the results suggest that environmental liability
overall is a substantial source of vacancy.
3.3 Suburban results
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 report the effect of liability on price and vacancy rate (respectively)
estimated on suburban data. The results suggest no effect of either liability rule on either outcome
variable in suburban locations: the point estimates of aL are all very close to zero and none are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. These estimates have two implications. First, they support the interpretation
of the earlier results as the effect of environmental liability, rather than some regional economic or
regulatory condition with which it is correlated; such other conditions would affect suburbs as well.
Second, they fail to support the hypothesis that suburban sites within the same state are substitutes
for central city sites when liability discourages development of the latter.
113.4 Robustness tests
Retroactive liability. In addition to the two liability rules addressed in the table, state liability
rules also vary in whether liability may be retroactive. Retroactive liability requires ﬁrms to pay
for cleanup from activities that predate the cleanup law. Data on this dimension of liability are
only available beginning in 1995, with few transitions, so a ﬁxed effects analysis of the variable is
impossible.
Adding a variable for retroactive liability to the cross-sectional equations (and restricting the
analysis to 1995 through 2000) does not yield a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on retroactive
liability for either price or vacancy rate. Retroactive liability has a very small coefﬁcient (-.02) on
vacancy rates; the coefﬁcients on the other liability rules remain about the same as in column (4)
in Table 3 (but the coefﬁcient on strict liability is not statistically signiﬁcant at 5%).
Serial correlation within a state. The equations rely on discrete changes in liability rules in a
subset of states and are thus subject to a standard concern about “difference-in-differences”: serial
correlation in errors within a state may bias the estimated standard errors. In particular, Bertrand
et al. (2004) argue that ordinary tests may dramatically over-reject the hypothesis that the policy
has zero effect. The earlier equations address this issue with standard errors that are clustered by
city, but the standard errors may still be biased because of the small number of policy transitions.
For this reason, the hypothesis tests were re-constructed using a “pairs cluster bootstrap-t,”
a method suggested by Cameron et al. (2008).11 The economic conclusions from the bootstrap
analysis do not differ from those in Table 3. The coefﬁcients on joint and several liability are
statistically signiﬁcant for both price and vacancy rate in central cities. All the remaining aL are
not statistically signiﬁcant with the bootstrapped t-distributions.
11A ﬁrst stage equation on city-level data was used to calculate state unexplained variation by year, which is then the
dependent variable for a panel analysis of state policies. This state panel equation is subject to the cluster bootstrap-
t. Samples are repeatedly drawn with replacement from the set of state histories in the data set and used to ﬁnd an
empirical distribution of the t-statistics for the coefﬁcients. Because it is based on the data, this empirical distribution
does not require assumptions about the nature of the serial correlation and addresses the small sample issues. The point
estimates of the coefﬁcients differ slightly because of somewhat different treatment of heterogeneity in the unbalanced
panel, but are similar to those reported above.
12Endogeneity of liability rules. Nonrandom assignment of liability regimes is another concern.
In particular, more extensive liability may be correlated with other characteristics that make states
less hospitable to development. Although ﬁxed effects can address unobserved heterogeneity
across places, time-varying unobserved heterogeneity in a given place remains a potential problem.
Endogeneity might also derive from reverse causality. The brownﬁelds issue has not been raised
in discussion of liability reform outside the economics literature, however, so reverse causality is a
less likely source of endogeneity than unobserved heterogeneity.
To address this concern, the equations were estimated with an instrumental variables approach,
using three instruments suggested by previous literature.12 When these instruments are used to
test for exogeneity of the liability rules, the Hausman test fails to reject exogeneity for either strict
liability or joint and several liability in the ﬁxed effects equations. The test statistic is low for the
price equations and moderate for the vacancy rate equations.13
4 Econometric analysis: Reported brownﬁelds
The analysis above considers the entire industrial real estate market, taking the view that liability
may affect any used industrial land whether or not it is formally a brownﬁeld. This section analyzes
a more limited data set with information on reported brownﬁelds.
4.1 Data on reported brownﬁelds
Surveys conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) provide the best available national
data on brownﬁelds. Respondents to the USCM surveys range from the largest cities to towns of
12First, Alberini and Austin (1999a) ﬁnd that the number of mining establishments in the state predicts adoption of
strict liability. Second, Alberini and Austin (2002) ﬁnd that the lagged frequency of accidental spills affects adoption
of liability rules; they hypothesize that states react to a ﬂurry of accidents by toughening their liability regimes. Current
accidental spills at active facilities should not affect the brownﬁelds problem, which involves past contamination, and
thus may be a suitable instrument for this analysis. Third, Campbell et al. (1998) use total lawyers per capita in a state
as an instrument in their analysis of the economic effects of tort reform, which often restrict joint and several liability.
The appendix provides more detail on construction of the instruments.
13According to the Hausman tests, endogeneity of the liability rules does remain a reasonable possibility in the
vacancy rate equations. When the central city vacancy rate equations are rerun with instrumental variables, the coefﬁ-
cients on both joint and several and strict liability are positive, but standard errors are very large.
13Table 4: Summary statitics for brownﬁelds data, by joint and several liability
All observations Without J&S With J&S
Median of brownﬁeld acres 100 100 116
Mean of brownﬁeld acres 723 375 829
Standard deviation of brownﬁeld acres 3964 727 4509
Percent joint and several liability 76.5 0 100
Percent strict liability 85.3 78.7 87.3
about 10,000 people. The USCM surveyed municipalities annually between 1997 and 1999 and
again in 2002. The total number of reporting cities/towns available for analysis is 376; 25% of the
locales are present in three or more years. The survey does not attempt to impose consistency in
the deﬁnition of brownﬁelds.14
The brownﬁelds data was matched with the ELI data on liability regimes. Unfortunately, the
narrow time range of the USCM surveys limits the study to cross-sectional identiﬁcation of the
effects of liability rules. During the relevant period, the ELI data on liability rules are available
only in 1997 and 2000, with only one transition in liability rules (Arizona eliminated strict liability
after 1997). The 2002 data extrapolates 1999 values for the liability rules.
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the brownﬁelds data. In the full data set, the cities
report an average of 723 acres of brownﬁeld sites. Although the mean brownﬁeld acres in the joint
and several cities is much larger, the distributions of acres appear almost identical until the 95th
percentile, where the joint and several cities include a few cities reporting tens of thousands of
acres. Both groups have medians (reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 4) of about 100 brownﬁeld
acres.15
14The brownﬁelds data show positive correlation with the vacancy rate data studied earlier. Although it is difﬁcult
to match the individual observations because of different samples and city deﬁnitions, the state average vacancy rate
has a correlation of .4 with the state brownﬁeld acres per capita in 1997 and in 2002.
15Dropping cities reporting more than 10,000 acres did not substantively change the estimates in the next subsection.




Joint and several liability .462 .690 .639
(.205) (.313) (.332)
Strict liability -.141 -.062 -.147
(.206) (.249) (.268)
Log(City population) .806 .776 .801
(.090) (.090) .(097)
Region effects? No Yes Yes
Other explanatory variables? No No Yes
R-squared .21 .24 .25
Number of cities 376 376 366
Number of observations 678 678 663
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the city level.
All equations also include year effects.
4.2 Results for reported brownﬁelds
Table 5 shows the results of equations with the log of reported brownﬁeld acreage in a city as
the dependent variable. The reported equations pool the data with city-level clustering of errors;
city random effects models yielded very similar estimates. The equation in column (1) of Table 5
includes only liability variables, the size of the city (from the USCM survey), and year dummies.
The effect of joint and several liability is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. As before, there is
no statistically signiﬁcant effect of strict liability.
To explore the inﬂuence of other geographic heterogeneity on the results, columns (2) and (3)
add ﬁrst region ﬁxed effects (for the nine Census Regions) and then covariates for economic con-
ditions and government activities in the city. Inclusion of this additional geographic heterogeneity
increases the point estimate on joint and several liability, so at least these forms of heterogeneity
do not seem to bias the liability coefﬁcients upward. With the full set of covariates, however, the
joint and several liability coefﬁcient is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
15The effects of joint and several liability in Table 5 are large. The coefﬁcient of .639 in column
(3) corresponds to 90% more brownﬁelds with joint and several liability than without. By com-
parison, the earlier estimates suggested 39% higher vacancy rates. Brownﬁelds sites have higher
expected contamination levels, so liability rules should have greater impact on these sites than a
typical vacant site.
5 Conclusions
The empirical analysis in this paper suggests that joint and several liability not only drives down
industrial real estate prices, but also increases the vacancy of industrial land. Both price and quan-
tity effects are found only in central cities where land is most contaminated and not in suburban
areas. The estimated equations show neither a price or a quantity effect from strict liability: stan-
dards for due care may be too high or too uncertain for negligence rules to provide much liability
protection. The paper also estimates equations on a separate data set of brownﬁelds reported by
cities to a national survey. These equations provide additional support for the conclusion that joint
and several liability discourages redevelopment, whereas strict liability does not.
Thus, although liability is at least partially capitalized, it still deters redevelopment. Deterrence
may result from a general inefﬁciency from liability, such as adverse selection or the judgment-
proof problem. It may also be speciﬁc to joint and several liability. With any of these causes,
the results provide an argument for reducing reliance on joint and several liability. However, joint
and several liability does have advantages that should be weighed against these costs. It gives the
government greater resources for cleanup and may facilitate settlement (Chang and Sigman, 2000).
A targeted approach that protects only buyers from joint and several liability might therefore be
better than broader liability relief.
16A Explanatory and instrumental variable construction
Industrial real estate market data set:
Liability variables: The ELI surveys are for 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000 (Pender-
grass, 2001). For the econometrics, continuity in liability rules is assumed for intervening
years (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998-99) when no change is reported. When the reports indicate a
change, liability regime variables are missing for intervening years. Because the ELI survey
does not specify the time of year, the equations use a one-year lag of liability variables to
represent the liability status at the time when transactions were planned. Thus, the remaining
observations begin in 1990.
Unemployment rate and manufacturing share of employment: The Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) provides data by city on unemployment rates, manufacturing employment, and to-
tal employment. Wheaton and Torto (1990) ﬁnd that manufacturing employment plays an
important role in industrial real estate demand.
Population: The population for the metropolitan area is from the Census; the entire metropolitan
area is used, regardless of whether the area is center city or suburbs
Highway density: The Federal Highway Administration provides annual city-level data on high-
way miles that can be used to calculate a time-varying measure of highway density for each
urban area.
Real estate taxes: SIOR provides an estimate of real estate taxes per square foot beginning in
1994.
Contaminated site lawyers per capita: Full-time equivalent lawyers in the state superfund pro-
gram, from ELI, divided by state population.
League of Conservation Voters score: The average League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score
for the House delegation of the state. The LCV score (which ranges from 0 to 100) rep-
resents the share of a legislator’s votes on selected measures that the LCV considers pro-
environment. As a measure of environmental sentiment, LCV scores have the virtue of
varying over time and of perhaps reﬂecting the position of the median voter in the state (in
contrast, for example, to environmental group membership, which focuses on the upper tail).
I use House rather than Senate scores because the House scores usually average more indi-
vidual legislators’ data, reducing noise, and can adjust more rapidly to changes because of
the potential for faster turnover in the House.
Pollution abatement cost index: Levinson (2000) adjusts the data from the U.S. Census survey on
Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) for the two-digit industry composition
in the state. The resulting index has the advantage of varying over time and capturing not just
legislative differences between states but also differences in monitoring and enforcement. A
major disadvantage is that it ends in 1994 when the Census stopped conducting its annual
survey. The series is linearly extrapolated for later years.
17Contaminated site density: The variable includes sites on the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS) and sites that on the
the no Further Remedial Action Planned (NFRAP) list. Both inventories have a ﬁeld for
SMSA, but it is rarely ﬁlled in, so the variable aggregates sites to the SMSA level by county
(using the 1990 SMSA deﬁnitions).
Historical manufacturing employment: Decennial county level data from 1940 through 1970 are
averaged and divided by land area to create a measure of the past spatial intensity of manu-
facturing for the city. Counties were aggregated to the SMSA level.
Instruments for liability rules: Three instruments are used: (i) the number of large mining estab-
lishments by state. This variable is from the Census of Mineral Industries for 1992 and 1997,
with forward and backward imputation for the remaining years. (ii) Number of spills aggre-
gated by state and year from the raw Emergency Response Notiﬁcation System (ERNS) data.
To follow Alberini and Austin, I restrict the count of spills to those that occurred at ﬁxed fa-
cilities (as opposed to transportation accidents, dumping, and other categories). (iii) Total
lawyers per capita in state. The American Bar Association reports the number of lawyers in
a state at irregular intervals (four times over the period of the data); missing years have been
linearly interpolated.
Explanatory variables for brownﬁelds (USCM) data:
Population: Figures are reported by the survey respondents and so are speciﬁc to the reporting
locale.
Unemployment rates and manufacturing share of employment: County data from BLS. The
USCM locales were matched to one or more counties based on populated place names.
For a few places where the populated place spans multiple counties, these variables are the
average over these counties.
Density of suspected contaminated sites and historical manufacturing: As discussed earlier and
merged by county.
Environmental policy measures: State contaminated site lawyers and LCV scores as above. The
pollution abatement cost index used previously as a measure of environmental stringency
would have to be entirely extrapolated for this data set, so is not used.
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